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Abstract
Features of all fifty sanctuary incidents occurring in 
Canada from 1983 to early 2009 are described and recent 
trends identified . The duration of sanctuary incidents has 
increased dramatically, the success rate has declined, and 
no new incidents have commenced in more than one and 
a half years . Sanctuary’s apparent decline in its “exposure” 
form as an effective resistance strategy is likely related to 
several factors, including less interest among mass media, 
the federal government’s adoption of a more authoritar-
ian approach toward immigration and refugee policy, and 
the rise of support for a merit-based legal appeal for failed 
refugee claimants evident in sanctuary discourse .
Résumé
Les caractéristiques des cinquante cas de sanctuaire sur-
venus au Canada de 1983 au début 2009 sont décrites 
et les tendances récentes identifiées . La durée des cas de 
sanctuaire a augmenté de façon spectaculaire, leur taux 
de réussite a diminué, et aucune nouvelle demande d’asile 
n’est survenue depuis plus d’un an et demi . La baisse appa-
rente de l’efficacité du refuge dans sa forme « médiatisée » 
comme stratégie de résistance est probablement liée à 
plusieurs facteurs, dont une baisse de d’intérêt parmi les 
médias de masse, l’adoption par le gouvernement fédéral 
d’une approche plus autoritaire à l’égard de politiques sur 
l’immigration et les réfugiés ainsi qu’une augmentation, 
évidente dans le discours entourant la notion du sanc-
tuaire, de l’appui pour le recours juridique fondé sur le 
mérite pour les demandeurs d’asile déboutés .
Introduction
Emerging in the early 1980s across the West, sanctuary 
has entailed providing protection in church buildings to 
migrants facing imminent arrest and deportation, often 
for extended periods, and making migrants’ plight known 
to the public and state authorities. By the early 2000s in 
Canada, this “exposure” form of sanctuary had become a de 
facto last court of appeal for some failed refugee claimants 
facing deportation. Yet, despite its relative success in secur-
ing status or reprieves for migrants in peril, more recently 
this form of sanctuary is showing signs of withering.1 One 
aspect cohering with this development, and revealing both 
of how sanctuary is changing and its possible future, is the 
rise of the merit-based appeal as an emergent goal in the 
discourse of sanctuary providers.
This article has two purposes. First, it seeks to update 
a comprehensive 2005 study of Canadian sanctuary that 
explored all thirty-six sanctuary “exposure” incidents from 
1983 to 2003.2 Another fourteen sanctuary incidents have 
commenced since and remain unexamined in relation to 
this earlier study’s findings. The aim in the first section of 
the paper, then, is to provide a brief but up-to-date sketch 
of twenty-six years of sanctuary in Canada and discern if 
and how this phenomenon is changing. Thus, I describe 
basic features and trends of the Canadian sanctuary phe-
nomenon to April 30, 2009. While many features of sanctu-
ary incidents remain largely unchanged after 2003, I argue 
the sanctuary phenomenon is nonetheless mutating in sev-
eral ways and most significantly—in its “exposure” form 
at least—is showing signs of withering away as a resistance 
strategy. Thus, despite increased awareness of sanctuary as 
a possible resort and its past success in securing positive 
legal outcomes, in recent years the duration of sanctuary 
incidents has increased dramatically; the success rate has 
noticeably declined from previous levels; and no new inci-
dents have occurred in more than a year and a half. The final 
part of the article, consistent with these findings, aims to 
further explore how and why sanctuary is changing. Thus, 
the second purpose of this article is to consider possible 
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reasons for identified trends and their implications for sanc-
tuary’s possible future. I argue that sanctuary’s apparent 
decline in its “exposure” form is likely due to several factors, 
including less interest among mass media and the federal 
Conservative party’s rise to power in 2006, accompanied by 
a more authoritarian approach to managing immigration 
and refugee policy than its Liberal government predecessor. 
However, the rise of support for a merit-based legal appeal 
for failed refugee claimants in sanctuary discourse is also 
significant in suggesting where sanctuary might be lead-
ing and is therefore paid special attention in this section. 
To accomplish both purposes, I draw on extensive empirical 
research on sanctuary occurrences in Canada from 1983 to 
early 2009.
Previous Sanctuary Research
Contemporary sanctuary activities were manifest in the 
United Kingdom as early as the late 1970s.3 Through the 
1980s, 1990s, and 2000s mass media reported sanctu-
ary activity across Western Europe, including in France, 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, 
and Finland, events that have yielded surprisingly little 
scholarship (but see this issue). In contrast, following its 
ascendancy beginning in the early 1980s in the US, sanctu-
ary received extensive study.4 Yet, despite the large corpus of 
US work stemming from several disciplines, much remains 
unknown about aspects of this phenomenon, including how 
and why sanctuary in a specific form mutates or withers 
over time. In Canada, prior to the early 2000s, scholarship 
on sanctuary was limited to several brief, obscure articles.5 
The only two extended accounts of singular Canadian sanc-
tuary occurrences in the early 1990s were authored by reli-
gious authorities.6 Due in part to this dearth of research, in 
late 2005 a comprehensive study of sanctuary incidents was 
published.7 Overall, sanctuary activity was found to consist 
mostly of local efforts separated socially and geographically 
from one another,8 rather than a discernible and integrated 
religious movement spanning regions or the nation.
This 2005 study and other previous scholarship distin-
guish between sanctuary as “exposure” and as “conceal-
ment.”9 Exposure entails purposively gaining attention of 
mass media, the public, and political authorities at local, 
regional, and/or national levels; concealment is essentially 
about avoiding such attention. Sanctuary as exposure is the 
main focus here; the full extent and features of instances 
of concealed sanctuary—though worthy of study—remain 
unknown, a point to which I return in the conclusion.10 That 
said, in Canada the basic distinction has proven permeable. 
The 2005 study showed that incidents in Montreal, Toronto, 
Edmonton, and other Canadian cities entailed concealing 
practices within exposure strategies. Nonetheless, for this 
article’s purposes a “sanctuary incident” is defined as an 
occurrence involving at least one migrant entering physical 
protection for at least one day to avoid deportation coupled 
with a strategic effort to concurrently expose this fact to 
mass media, broader publics, and political authorities. This 
definition throws into relief the kinds of practices not con-
sidered to be “sanctuary incidents” here. Occasionally pub-
licized promises to grant sanctuary by church officials have 
not been followed by action,11 in which case migrants have 
avoided having to enter the physical protection of sanctuary 
but nonetheless have achieved a governmental reprieve or 
received legal status seemingly as a consequence. As well, 
since 1983 two instances of concealed sanctuary have been 
“exposed” after the fact, which is to say that exposure was 
not a strategy to aid those threatened with expulsion at the 
moment or in the immediate aftermath of granting sanctu-
ary.12 Several churches have also assisted migrants to fight 
deportation using tactics closely associated with sanctuary 
efforts, for example, protesting, publicly proclaiming sup-
port, or paying legal fees,13 but without providing physical 
protection from authorities. These three sets of circum-
stances—threatened sanctuary, concealed sanctuary lack-
ing purposeful exposure, and anti-deportation efforts of 
churches not entailing physical protection—are presently 
either unknowable or comparatively rare and are therefore 
excluded from consideration as incidents in this article.
Research Procedures
Research procedures necessarily overlap with those in the 
2005 study. No organization or group collects and pub-
lishes comprehensive information about sanctuary inci-
dents as defined above. Therefore, Internet search engines 
covering news and refugee-advocacy-related websites and 
indexes covering major newspapers and national popular 
and church periodicals from the mid-1970s to early 2009 
were exhaustively searched. Providing the most compre-
hensive, up-to-date portrait of sanctuary possible there-
fore required sifting through a large volume of material to 
discern texts documenting sanctuary events. Beginning in 
the late 1990s, temporary websites had been erected that 
exposed migrants’ predicament and instructed virtual vis-
itors on how to support the sanctuary effort. These served as 
a further abundant data source. As well, forty-eight open-
focused interviews with supporters intimately involved in 
sanctuary efforts were conducted from 2001 to 2007. These 
persons included clergy, retirees, small business owners, 
labour union officials, lawyers, and medical professionals 
who were members of churches or local communities in 
which the incidents occurred.14 These interviews entailed 
questions on incidents’ origins, organization, and outcomes; 
provided detail unavailable elsewhere; and facilitated access 
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to unpublished documents assembled by sanctuary provid-
ers from twelve incidents, including four of longer duration. 
Providers’ documents included correspondence, leaflets, 
press releases, chronologies, petitions, texts of relevant legal 
decisions, and minutes of support group meeting. For this 
article, new data pertaining to incidents occurring from 
2004 to April 30, 2009, were integrated and compared with 
existing data from 1983 to 2003.
Part One: A Brief Portrait of Twenty-Six Years of 
Sanctuary in Canada
In what follows I briefly update several basic features of sanc-
tuary in Canada documented in the 2005 study: religious 
denomination, church location, recipients’ characteristics (i .e ., 
age, sex, number, and nationality), legal outcome, duration, 
and prevalence (i .e ., year of commencement). I also identify 
key trends regarding several of these aspects since 2003.
Religious Denominations and Church Locations
To date, sanctuary has involved Christian denominations 
almost exclusively. Of the fifty incidents, eight (13 per cent) 
 involved Anglican churches, twelve (24 per cent) United, 
fourteen (30 per cent) Catholic, and fifteen (30 per cent) 
involved other Christian denominations. This was expected 
given these three denominations’ dominance, and that of 
Christian churches generally, within Canadian commun-
ities. The remaining sanctuary incident involved a Sikh and 
a Hindu temple.15 Several cities have experienced a dispro-
portionate number of sanctuary incidents, including ten 
in Montreal (20 per cent), nine in Vancouver (18 per cent), 
five in each of Winnipeg (10 per cent) and Ottawa (10 per 
cent), and three in each of Calgary (6 per cent) and Toronto 
(6 per cent). Not surprisingly, these are cities where refugee 
determination hearings take place,16 where refugee claims 
are consistently rejected, and therefore where persons most 
likely to be later granted sanctuary reside. The remaining 
fifteen incidents have occurred in smaller centres across 
Canada (no incidents have occurred in Saskatchewan, 
Prince Edward Island, or northern jurisdictions).
Recipients
A total of 288 migrants now have been granted sanctuary 
across fifty incidents. The overall average age of adult migrants 
at the centre of incidents and for which information is avail-
able is 37.1 (N=61). This means migrants’ age has increased 
markedly, from 34.7 (N = 47) before 2003, to 45.1 (N = 14) 
afterward. This is tantamount to a shift from young adult to 
middle-aged adult migrants receiving sanctuary. In terms of 
sex, twenty-five incidents (50 per cent) involved migrants of 
both sexes, eighteen (36 per cent) involved males only, and 
seven (14 per cent) females only. Almost half the incidents 
(twenty-three) involved only one migrant. The remaining 
incidents involved two (6 per cent), three (6 per cent), four (6 
per cent), five (10 per cent), and greater than five (14 per cent) 
migrants. Together these findings reveal, as noted in the 2005 
study, that the most typical incident involves a single adult 
male. This is evinced in seventeen incidents (34 per cent). 
Significantly, almost half this total (eight, or 16 per cent of 
all incidents) has occurred since 2003, and although there 
remains some variability across the occurrences, this kind 
of incident has become decidedly more typical. Thus, while 
variability in the sex and number of sanctuary recipients con-
tinues, it has declined since 2003. Extreme variability remains 
evident, however, in the nationality of those granted sanctu-
ary, whereby thirty-two nationalities are represented in the 
fifty incidents, with Salvadoran (four) being the most preva-
lent. This statistic remains consistent with the 2005 study and 
thus with the localized, contingent character of sanctuary 
provision in Canada. It remains largely incongruous with con-
ceiving sanctuary as an organized social movement reacting 
to failed refugee claimants from specific regions or nations.
Legal Outcomes and Duration
In all fifty incidents, arrest17 and deportation of the migrants 
concerned was effectively delayed for at least several days. 
This time permitted church, community, and political sup-
port to grow through carefully managed public exposure of 
migrants’ plight; funds to be raised through donations and 
other activities to retain superior legal representation and 
pay for private sponsorship applications, “humanitarian 
and compassionate” claims, and additional Federal Court 
appeals; and often some level of negotiation with immigra-
tion authorities and the Minister to commence. As well, as 
shown in Table 1, a majority of the fifty sanctuary incidents 
manifesting in Canadian communities over the past twenty-
six years have yielded favourable legal outcomes for migrants, 
eventually leading to immigrant status or comparable legal 
arrangements (e .g ., a long-term permit to remain in Canada). 
Excluding the five incidents involving mixed, undecided, 
and unknown outcomes, 73.3 per cent (thirty-three of forty-
five) yielded legal status for the migrants involved.
TABLE 1: Legal status outcome of migrants 
granted sanctuary, 1983–(Apr. 30) 2009
Outcome N  %
Permanent/long-term legal status 
expected/gained
33  66.0
Deported/went underground 12  24.0
Undecided/unknown  4  8.0
Some gained status/some deported  1  2.0
 50 100.0
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The thorny path to securing permanent legal status or long-
term permission to remain in Canada varied significantly 
across the incidents too. In almost one-third of the incidents 
sanctuary recipients were required to temporarily and “vol-
untarily” exit sanctuary (and Canada), legally enter nations 
such as the US and then reapply for immigrant status there, 
or re-enter the refugee determination process after a desig-
nated period consistent with Canada’s immigration regula-
tions at the time. In these instances this was accomplished 
usually through Department of Immigration’s promises 
of special or expedited consideration of applications. Such 
promises remained unofficial and verbal to allow immigra-
tion and relevant political authorities to avoid declaring a 
general amnesty or establishing precedent affecting other 
migrants in similar dire situations. Other sanctuary cases 
ended with the granting of a Minister’s Permit or a Federal 
Court ruling. The remaining incidents have concluded with 
migrants exiting to “go underground” and live “illegally”; 
surrendering to immigration officials; undergoing police 
arrest and deportation; or several of these outcomes.
Recent Trends
There is an overall average of two incidents commencing 
per year (N = 50). Yet, suggestive of sanctuary’s decline as 
a resistance strategy, as of April 30, 2009, no new incidents 
have appeared for twenty-two months (the Singh incident 
involving a Sikh and a Hindu temple began on July 1, 2007) 
and none commencing in Christian churches for more than 
two years. More significant is the recent trend in incident 
duration. The average duration of all18 sanctuary incidents 
is 314.6 days (N = 49). However, in the 1980s (N = 2) it was 
only 19 days. During 1990–1994 (N = 5)19 the duration was 
113.5 days. For 1995–1999 (N = 16) it reached 182.3 days; for 
2000–2004, (N = 14), 313.6 days; and for 2005–early 2009, 
(N = 11), the average duration was an astonishing 686.6 
days . This last statistic is remarkable because it is more than 
double the average incident duration in the preceding five-
year period and almost four times the average duration of 
the late 1990s. In short, incident duration has increased 
dramatically since 2005. This means a decidedly more ardu-
ous two-year sanctuary experience for providers entailing 
provision of continuous material and moral support, and 
for migrants entailing efforts to garner support and survive 
in the spatial confines of a church building for a protracted 
period. At the same time, only five of eleven incidents (46 
per cent) since January 1, 2005, have yielded legal status for 
the migrants involved. This is markedly lower than the over-
all success rate of 70 per cent (N = 30), noted in the 2005 
study for the period ending 2003.
Part Two: Considering Trends, the Merit-based 
Appeal, and Sanctuary’s Future
What follows is not the last word but rather an effort to fur-
ther stimulate thinking about how and why sanctuary activ-
ity may be changing and to contemplate its future in Canada. 
One aspect that should be noted at the outset in this regard 
is that the recent trends, described above, are likely inter-
twined. That is, the lack of new incidents of late may well 
be due in part to would-be providers and recipients recog-
nizing increasing duration and to a lesser extent fewer suc-
cesses of other recent incidents. It may well be that potential 
and previous providers (and migrants) recognize the daunt-
ing sacrifices required over a much longer period to main-
tain sanctuary and the greater uncertainty about whether 
sanctuary would lead to legal status. As well, duration may 
be a direct reflection of greater difficulty in negotiating and 
otherwise securing legal status for the migrants involved 
that is reflected in the lower success rate. Nevertheless, the 
increased duration and the dearth of new incidents are also 
possibly due to other factors. These include less attention 
from mass media as well as the federal government’s adop-
tion of a tougher stance toward sanctuary recipients. Both 
would render sanctuary as “exposure” less feasible and more 
difficult to undertake. I discuss these two factors before 
turning to the merit-based appeal.
Sanctuary as “exposure” and its success are highly 
dependent on whether and how the incident is depicted in 
mass media. Sanctuary decisions elicit an exceptional qual-
ity.20 Stemming from this exceptional aspect, sanctuary 
has garnered mass media attention since 1983. This process 
placed migrants’ experiences in the refugee determination 
process (including inadequate legal representation, transla-
tion errors, and general neglect of new evidence in support 
of claims) in the public spotlight along with claims about 
the ignored worth of migrant families and individuals to the 
nation—and, typically, to a specific local church and com-
munity. However, the dwindling rarity of sanctuary (the fact 
that there now have been fifty incidents) may well be making 
this form less extraordinary and newsworthy over the past 
few years.21 With each new occurrence, subsequent exposure 
and potential support may decline. It may also be more dif-
ficult to generate compassion and sympathy in mass media 
and/or among would-be supporters and providers from the 
local church and community due to the trend noted above 
toward not only more single adult male migrants entering 
sanctuary, but also toward older (middle-aged) male 
migrants compared, for example, to nuclear families with 
children. A sanctuary provider in Edmonton noted this was 
a factor in the support generated for a migrant family:
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If it was just him … ‘Okay you’re a big boy … look after yourself ’ 
… but when you see little children and a woman that through no 
fault of her own … [is] in a foreign country with no way of get-
ting back, no way of communicating … The congregation … had 
a great deal of empathy for them which they may not have had for 
just M had he been single. (Interview 14, 2001)
Another factor leading to a lower success rate may well be 
a harder line among Ministers of Immigration and officials. 
While it remains unclear whether the arrest of Mohammed 
Cherfi in a Quebec City church in 2004 by police on a bail-
related rather than an immigration offence was encouraged 
by the Immigration Minister or officials,22 the extensive mass 
media coverage that followed undoubtedly suggested that a 
harder line in the form of physical arrest and detention of 
sanctuary recipients by immigration officials was now a real 
possibility. This harder line is also seen in the Immigration 
Minister’s and officials’ public refusals to negotiate with 
sanctuary recipients and supporters. This is especially evi-
dent in statements by Ministers of Immigration since the 
departure of Judy Sgro in 2004 and the Liberal government’s 
subsequent failure to secure a majority of seats in Parliament 
in the following election, but especially since the subsequent 
rise to power of the Conservative party in 2006 and its more 
authoritarian approach to immigration and refugee policy. 
Emblematic of their new approach is the recent decision to 
grant more power over immigrant selection to the Minister 
of Immigration, an historical change from past immigra-
tion policy.23
Whatever the effect of these factors on sanctuary prac-
tices, as significant may be a gradual mutation in sanctu-
ary discourse, one which may also shed light on sanctuary’s 
future. While its absence from the formal refugee determin-
ation process continues, even after enabling legislation, the 
merit-based legal appeal has been gradually more present in 
sanctuary discourse. It is this less obvious discursive muta-
tion to which I now turn.
Refugee Determination and the Merit-based Appeal
The twists and turns of ever-mutating Canadian refugee 
determination and related deportation policies and practi-
ces are too complex to recount here.24 Nevertheless, some 
background is required. Refugee determination adopted in 
the 1980s what has been termed an “advanced liberal” char-
acter evident in the movement of responsibility away from 
the whims of federal political authorities and Department of 
Immigration officials and into the hands of an arms-length 
Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). Cohering with this 
shift toward governing refugee determination “at a distance” 
was the march of administrative law into determination—as 
seen in establishment of the oral hearings held before this 
tribunal—that effectively created a legal domain never seen 
before. Put another way, the inherently political question of 
“who is a refugee?” underwent juridification in Canada. As 
well, knowledge generated for refugee determination pur-
poses had been deemed politically tainted since formaliza-
tion of the process in the early 1980s and for this reason in 
1989 the documentation centre was implemented to over-
come this situation, its openness to public scrutiny being a 
key element of the new program’s design.25 It is this ongoing 
effort to ensure distance between determination decisions 
and the whims of Canadian political authorities that serves 
as a condition of possibility for the later ascendancy of the 
merit-based appeal.
Absent in determination policy from the 1970s onward, 
and still omitted from formal determination practices, is a 
merit-based appeal of a rejected refugee claim that would 
allow, for example, introduction of new evidence supportive 
of a claim during a formal hearing in the event of a negative 
status decision. Nonetheless, three “appeals”26 have become 
available during the determination domain’s formative per-
iod. The first is an appeal at the Federal Court of Canada 
on points of law if an error is deemed to have occurred. 
The second is a risk assessment for failed refugee claimants 
facing deportation whereby a Department of Immigration 
official examines a failed claimant’s file to determine if 
an immediate threat to the claimant’s life will result from 
deportation. If a risk of return and Federal Court review are 
rejected, a claimant can request humanitarian and compas-
sionate intervention by the Minister of Immigration to stay. 
The vast majority of all three “appeals” by refugee claimants, 
however, tend to be rejected.
Two other developments require brief mention for the 
discussion that follows. First, during this formative period 
the formal introduction of private sponsor resettlement 
programs—many of which were church affiliated—also 
occurred.27 Resettlement from then on would have a decid-
edly more private character. Second, another heretofore 
unrecognized aspect of this general shift consistent with 
the onset of advanced liberalism28 occurring in the 1990s 
was the drastic reduction in Ontario and other provincial 
jurisdictions of public funding for legal aid provision. Thus, 
it became more difficult for refugee claimants to secure 
adequate publicly funded legal representation for determin-
ation hearings, requiring them to rely on private sources for 
adequate representation more than previously. It is from this 
context that sanctuary emerged, the factors encouraging its 
emergence therefore including a movement of responsibility 
for adequate determination and resettlement toward private 
spheres.
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The Rise of the Merit-based Appeal in Sanctuary 
Discourse
What goes unrecognized in recent public and mass media 
discourse is that calls from refugee advocates for introduc-
tion of a merit-based appeal29 have been around for at least a 
quarter of a century in Canada whereas a clear link between 
this call and sanctuary activity is evident only later in 1993 
in relation to one incident involving the Southern Ontario 
Sanctuary Coalition (SOSC). As a Coalition member stated: 
“We didn’t take on more cases … while we were carrying 
on the struggle with the government over our demand for 
a fair appeal system, which was the focus of our demands, 
our actions, the legal focus” (Interview 4, 2001). A Coalition 
member further remarked:
The government was restricting appeals and the legislation from 
[19]89 decisively restricted it. Not absolutely, but almost abso-
lutely. You can’t get an appeal on the merits of the case, only on 
the procedure. If the judge really fell asleep during the trial, you’d 
get an appeal. (Interview 3, 2001)
Yet, the Coalition’s focus on the appeal was anomalous 
among sanctuary efforts and not taken up by other sanc-
tuary providers across Canada until long after 1993. What 
is significant, however, in contemplating the future of sanc-
tuary in its “exposure” form is that this Coalition was not 
involved in granting this form of sanctuary to additional 
migrants after 1993. Thus, SOSC’s advocacy for the merit-
based appeal as a bona fide alternative to sanctuary and rec-
ognizing the two on the same plane seems to cohere with 
their avoidance of instigating this form of sanctuary in their 
later efforts.
The call for the appeal stemmed mostly from elsewhere 
and, in particular, those well-versed in determination 
practices:
There were a lot of groups—including the CCR—[the Canadian 
Council for Refugees which raised the issue of] just the lack of 
meaningful appeal, that there could be new information that was 
directly relevant [to the claimant’s case], and there was no place 
for it to go. And I think what happened in 93 [when the Sanctuary 
Coalition granted sanctuary to twenty-three claimants] … was 
just maybe the tip of a very large iceberg that we had surfaced. 
And it was like there had to be a way of appealing or more of this 
[sanctuary] was going to happen … and it didn’t come from the 
government, it came from the refugee board people [i .e ., IRB 
members]. Like they knew that there were times when a document 
would arrive, after [the case had been rejected], that was directly 
relevant. (Interview 5, 2001; emphasis added)
After a few sanctuary incidents had occurred across Canada 
in preceding years, in 1994 the now defunct Interchurch 
Committee on Refugees (ICCR) comprising representatives 
from Canada’s mainline churches launched a pilot project 
called “Keeping Faith.”30 Housing migrants in churches 
plainly came with challenges and risks and this proposal 
was an explicit attempt to create a more organized, less 
risky version of sanctuary (that was not unlike the SOSC’s 
effort, in that no one would know migrants’ locations while 
in sanctuary). A provider noted in 2001:
I think we were getting discouraged that certain cases were falling 
through the cracks that we felt were strong cases and they were not 
being accepted. And of course we don’t have an appeal, so what can 
you do? So what we thought was …, maybe this would be a way of 
getting groups of churches across the country to participate and 
what we proposed was that, for instance, if we found a refugee or 
a refugee family that we felt had a strong legitimate case that—
for whatever reason—had failed all the layers of hearings … like 
what we had discovered is a number of them actually who were 
quote, unquote, going underground anyway and so we thought 
what about if we made this project where … they would go under-
ground but there would be a contact person who knew them [and] 
who would be our contact? (Interview 2, 2001; emphasis added)
Significantly, while referred to in this 2001 interview 
excerpt, texts associated with this “Keeping Faith” initiative 
from 1994 avoid mention of a merit-based appeal as an aim. 
Its emphasis came later and was not a key justification at the 
time.
That the expressed need for a merit-based appeal in refu-
gee policy did not stem from local sanctuary providers is 
further evinced by the fact that interviews from 2001 and 
2002 reveal providers rarely refer to an “appeal.” When 
they do, “appeal” tends to be used loosely to refer to one or 
more of the three means of gaining permission to remain in 
Canada described earlier in relation to the specific migrant(s) 
to whom sanctuary was granted, rather than a formal and 
extensive legal procedure conducted before a specialized 
judicial board. For example, a provider acknowledged “vari-
ous means of appeal” (Interview 17, 2001); another noted 
“a number of different other appeals I guess that they go 
through” (Interview 2, 2001). Yet another remarked:
They went to a lawyer I recommended and their case is now 
going … into the humanitarian appeals [sic]. So, generally you 
will, if you get the right lawyer and the right stage of appeal, if 
all being well, usually you can work it through … (Interview 13, 
2001)
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Early on, then, the merit-based appeal was promoted by 
refugee advocates in the legal know, not by local sanctuary 
providers, most of whom were non-experts drawn from the 
local church and community and unfamiliar with existing 
refugee policy, especially in the early going of their sanctuary 
provision effort.31 It is after 2002 that the need for a merit-
based appeal became a central claim of sanctuary provid-
ers, a nascent “Holy Grail,” as it were. This was undoubtedly 
sparked at least in part by the appeal’s appearance in new 
immigration and refugee legislation the year prior.
Following a comprehensive review of Canada’s immi-
gration and refugee policy the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA) was passed in 2001 and came into 
force in June 2002. This Act set out provisions for a Refugee 
Appeal Division (RAD) that would for the first time con-
sider appeals of rejected cases based on the merits of the 
refugee claim.32 Beginning in 1989 two IRB officials had 
become responsible for deciding whether a claim for refu-
gee status met criteria outlined in the international Refugee 
Convention. Under IRPA, refugee claimants would now 
appear before only one IRB official. It was acknowledged, 
however, that there was a potential risk of arbitrary and 
erroneous decision-making under this new arrangement 
due to a single board member making decisions that could 
profoundly affect a claimant’s future, a concern fed by sev-
eral public scandals that occurred since 1989 centring on 
bribery of appointed IRB members and their biased decision 
making. This shift from two board members to one was cen-
tral to the RAD’s justification and placing the appeal in draft 
legislation was a key political maneuver to overcome refugee 
advocate resistance (but not necessarily to overcome sanc-
tuary per se–providers were not invited to participate in the 
formal legislative review as sanctuary providers, unlike what 
was to transpire beginning in 2004, as described below). On 
the eve of the new legislation’s promised implementation a 
key member of SOSC, who is also a refugee advocate, noted 
that “the new legislation does allow for an appeal at the refu-
gee board and that’s a major step forward. It’s in writing, it’s 
not in person, but it’s still a big step” (Interview 5, 2001). This 
sentiment was to be short-lived. Implementation of RAD 
never happened. From then on the appeal’s absence became 
increasingly publicly touted as an alternative to sanctuary 
as “exposure.”
In June 2004, then–Immigration Minister Judy Sgro 
made an unusual public call for mainline Christian churches 
to stop granting sanctuary, claiming churches were serving 
as a “back door” for failed refugee claimants seeking legal 
status in Canada. Church representatives were then invited 
to meet with the Immigration Minister and her staff. In 
September 2004, a meeting with representatives from Roman 
Catholic, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Mennonite, Quaker, and 
United denominations was held. The Minister made an 
offer to churches that would permit their regular submis-
sion of names of exceptional cases for independent review 
with a ten-day turnaround.33 The Minister argued the other 
“appeals” protected failed claimants at risk. She nonetheless 
proposed to church representatives they could submit about 
twelve cases to the Minister to review annually,34 not unlike 
existing practices entailing recommendations made within 
the private sponsor resettlement programs noted earlier. 
This is significant because it assumed a small number of 
exceptions would be required and it would be the Minister 
who would ultimately decide their exceptional status. This 
new arrangement would displace the stated need for sanc-
tuary and the merit-based appeal system (the assumed 
cost of which was deemed to contrast sharply with existing 
“advanced liberal” demands for efficiency) enshrined in the 
new Act. Yet, it is difficult for sanctuary to be incorporated 
into existing refugee determination (and selection) pro-
cesses due in part to differences between “the values of the 
agencies of civil society and norms of public accountabil-
ity.”35 The issue it raises is analogous to the conflict-ridden 
plan of the former US Bush administration to publicly fund 
faith-based groups to dispense services to the poor. For their 
part, church leaders argued publicly there would be fewer 
sanctuary incidents if IRPA’s RAD had been implemented. 
When details of this offer became public, due to its secret 
and exclusive nature, a rash of criticism ensued. In early 
November 2004, the Minister responded with a revised 
arrangement that would give other (secular) civil society 
groups formal authority to bring a few cases forward annu-
ally. A meeting with church representatives followed in mid-
November. Yet, church representatives subsequently refused 
to become part of this process. One church representative 
from the United Church, the denomination involved in the 
second-greatest number of incidents (i .e ., twelve), stated that 
sanctuary would continue with or without approval of this 
new process.36
Nevertheless, since 2004 the explicit link between the 
two mechanisms has been increasing. By September 2004, 
a regional Interfaith Sanctuary Coalition had formed and 
was already claiming the need to implement the appeal. In 
2006 the first Presbyterian Church statement on sanctuary 
was published and made a similar recommendation.37 As 
a Catholic bishop remarked at a 2007 rally: “The problem 
is not recourse to sanctuary, but the flawed Canadian refu-
gee determination system that leaves too many refugees 
without protection.”38 As with so much refugee politics, 
international bodies also provided a source of domestic 
articulation of the issue as seen when an Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights report from the late 1990s 
that assessed Canada’s treatment of asylum seekers in 
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Canada’s refugee determination system was invoked dur-
ing this period. The Commission recommended an appeal 
process on the merits of a claim for refugee status. In the fall 
of 2004, KAIROS, an ecumenical group, launched a pub-
lic campaign calling for implementation of the RAD. More 
than twenty-five thousand persons signed petitions submit-
ted to Parliament in April and June of 2005. More recently, 
a May 2007 report by the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration recommended 
that officials respect the right of churches and other reli-
gious organizations to provide sanctuary to those believed 
to need protection. This had followed an invitation in 2006 
to not only church representatives, but also local sanctuary 
providers, to represent their thoughts on sanctuary to par-
liamentarians at Committee hearings. Front and centre in 
their testimony to the Committee was the link between the 
absence of the appeal and the granting of sanctuary. One 
noted: “Canada is obligated to provide sanctuary to those in 
need, and there are times like the present, given the lack of 
appeal, when as citizens and human beings we have a fun-
damental and moral obligation to provide sanctuary within 
Canada.”39 The SOSC held their first national consultation 
in November 2007 (see this issue), bringing together sanc-
tuary providers from beyond the local Ontario region to 
discuss sanctuary experiences and strategy. Though there 
have been meetings amongst sanctuary providers from dif-
ferent regions before, this was the first of national scope. 
The outcome included a call to implement the merit-based 
appeal. It is intriguing that no new sanctuary as “exposure” 
incidents40 have occurred since this consultation was held. 
Through a growing embrace of the merit-based appeal, the 
aim of sanctuary providers is becoming less parochial and 
local, and more national and policy-oriented.
Another way that sanctuary is changing consonant with 
the foregoing requires mention. The 2005 study argued that 
sanctuary has a complex relationship with law. Sanctuary 
discourse was shown to comprise at least three legal narra-
tives, including a “with the law” narrative,41 in which law 
is assumed to be neither majestic nor oppressive (the other 
two narratives), but rather as a strategy to pursue personal 
interests in a pragmatic game. This connection is seen in the 
following typical excerpt from interviews with sanctuary 
providers in which an “appeal” is seen to be necessarily car-
ried out by lawyers:
So anyway they came home and that was the point at which they 
believed that they were going to be deported. And again, the attor-
ney said, well listen, we are filing one more appeal and filing an 
appeal to stay the deportation, I am filing an appeal to have the 
original decision by immigration reviewed . I am filing all of these 
appeals . (Interview 36, 2001; emphasis added)
The appeal is evinced as tightly tethered to the purchase of 
lawyers’ services: “And then it was only when we decided 
okay let’s try to fight this, let’s try to file an appeal to the 
Division of Immigration. It was only then that we decided 
to consult a lawyer” (Interview 7, 2001). These are pragmatic 
concerns and therefore one consequence of accepting the 
realization of the merit-based appeal as one of sanctuary’s 
central goals is to begin to limit horizons to legal games, to 
the “with the law” legal narrative to the neglect of other nar-
ratives that have helped render sanctuary possible. To the 
extent this occurs, sanctuary activity is likely to continue to 
dwindle in the Canadian context,42 the signs of which are 
found in the trends identified above.
Conclusion
The foregoing allows some conclusions to be drawn about 
sanctuary activity in Canada. It remains almost exclusively 
a Christian phenomenon occurring in major urban centres 
in which refugee determination processes take place. Key 
trends that are likely interrelated are the increasing dur-
ation of incidents, the decreasing success, and the lack of 
new incidents. While probably not the end of sanctuary 
in its “exposure” form (there will likely be isolated future 
incidents), these are nonetheless signs of its decline as an 
effective strategy of securing legal status for migrants facing 
imminent deportation. It is possible the same factors leading 
to its decline have been fuelling an increase in sanctuary as 
“concealment” in recent years, but this remains difficult—
by definition—to know and, barring research involving key 
informants, might only become known long after the fact.
While factors such as “compassion fatigue” and less inter-
est among the public and mass media, coupled with a harder 
federal government line, may be related to these trends, 
the claims and discourse of sanctuary providers operat-
ing outside these dominant institutions matters too. While 
not implemented, and therefore present only in discourse, 
the merit-based appeal is real in its enabling effects. This 
is evinced in the way it has been binding local sanctuary 
providers together in common pragmatic cause. The appeal 
may yet turn out to be a means to seamlessly merge con-
cerns of sanctuary providers, refugee advocates, and immi-
gration authorities. If those who would grant sanctuary are 
effective in generating greater support for implementation 
of the merit-based appeal they will have made a significant 
difference. This also means that sanctuary’s effects, as noted 
in the 2005 study,43 will have reached well beyond the lives 
of migrants who find themselves at the centre of incidents.
A final note about sanctuary research is in order. While 
most Western countries have experienced sanctuary activ-
ity in recent decades, it has taken dissimilar trajectories 
and adopted varied forms. The sanctuary movement in the 
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US effectively expired in the early 1990s but recently sev-
eral cities in California have announced they will serve as 
public sanctuaries, thus suggesting resurgence (see also this 
issue). The reasons for changes in sanctuary activity and its 
manifestations such as this would benefit from more sys-
tematic comparative research between countries, especially 
since each is oriented to specific federal policy regimes with 
little or no international co-operation currently evident 
(though Canadians played a key role in the US Sanctuary 
Movement44). Mirroring the Canadian context, sanctuary 
in Germany also commenced in 1983, has been similarly 
organized as incidents, and has shown a remarkably similar 
overall rate of success.45 Rather than looking to the US for 
insight into sanctuary, due to more analogous characteris-
tics and likely available data, comparison of sanctuary in 
Canada with Germany could permit making further sense 
of mutations in sanctuary activity evident in the Canadian 
trends above as well as beyond the Canadian context.
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